An experimental study of the nature of consumer expectations. by Bolger, Fergus
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Although important both theoretically and practically, the nature of consumer economic 
expectation formation has been little studied, particularly by psychologists. The most 
relevant previous research suggests that expectations are based on a heuristic that results 
in them being significantly biased. Further, relevant indicator series are poorly utilized. 
However, this earlier research used a task lacking in potentially important features of the 
real world, and this may have impaired performance. In the current experiment, 
participants received a more ecologically-valid task. Although there was still evidence of 
heuristic use, leading to suboptimal performance and bias, this performance was 
significantly better than anticipated from previous research, particularly regarding use of 
indicator series. However, when a strong trend in the criterion series allowed accurate 
forecasting without consideration of indicators, they were little used. I conclude that 
expectations are formed by first extrapolating the criterion series and only if that works 
poorly is other relevant information considered. Thus consumers appear to trade-off 
accuracy against effort, such that more effort is expended only when some threshold of 





The recent financial crisis and subsequent recession has led to a parallel crisis in 
Economics. How did so many economists fail to foresee the crisis? And what of the 
prevailing assumptions of rational economic agents, and consequently efficient markets, 
which justified the practices that largely caused the crisis? However, what is bad for 
economists turns out to be good for psychologists. Many of those who did not accept the 
rational-and-efficient assumption are either Keynesians, who acknowledge the important 
role of psychological variables in economic activity, or are those working on the margins 
of economics and psychology: decision scientists, behavioural economists, and economic 
psychologists (see e.g., Krugman, 2009).  
 The first of these latter, decision scientists, have the longest history, dating back 
to such critics of the rationality assumption as Herb Simon and Ward Edwards whose 
work began in the 1950‟s (Edwards, 1954; 1961; Simon, 1956, 1979). These researchers 
proposed that people are unable to conform to standards of rationality encapsulated in 
normative theories, such as Expected Value Maximization and Bayes‟ Theorem, due to 
psychological limitations: memory span, processing speed, channel capacity and the like. 
They then began to catalogue a number of biases in judgment and decision making that 
resulted from such restrictions, and proposed descriptive alternatives to the normative 
theories – the most notable being Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979). More 
recently a growing number of economists have become interested in psychological 
aspects of economic behaviour, largely in response to the growing number of observed 
„anomalies‟ – economic phenomena not accounted for by (neo) classical economic 
theory. This has resulted in the burgeoning field of behavioural economics/finance. 
Psychologists have also entered the fray, treating economic behaviour as a subject of 
 3 
psychological inquiry without necessarily any reference to, or even knowledge of, 
economists‟ theories of this behaviour. Krugman (2009), for one, sees the current crisis as 
an opportunity for Keynesians, and economists with a psychological bent, to gain the 
upper hand in both economic theory and practice. 
 In this paper I wish to focus on a small, but important, part of this „debate‟ 
between psychologists and psychologically-inclined economists, and rational-and-
efficient economists – economic expectations. In any economy operating above 
subsistence level people have the ability to regulate their own economic behaviour, in 
other words, consumption becomes discretionary. Discretionary consumption means that 
people must decide how to spend, save, invest and so forth. As Katona (1972) points out 
this decision making depends upon various psychological constructs, particularly 
preferences between various consumption experiences, and expectations about certain 
future states being realized. For example, a decision to buy a car with your lottery 
winnings, or instead put the money into treasury bills, will be influenced by a 
combination of expectations about your future financial security (e.g. will you have a job 
in a year‟s time?), and the desirability of the alternatives (e.g. how much do you feel a 
new car will improve your life?). While preference formation is an area of great 
theoretical and practical significance (particularly to those wishing to influence tastes, 
such as marketers and politicians), it is not my concern here, rather, I wish to examine the 
basis of economic expectations. 
 A number of economists, and others, have sought to determine the nature of 
economic expectations. On of the earliest was Keynes himself who drew attention to the 
important role of expectations in the functioning of the economy in his „General Theory 
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of Employment, Interest and Money‟ (1936). Keynes argued that the need to take action 
forces people to form expectations, and that these expectations are based on various 
„judgment conventions‟. An example of a judgment convention might be that the current 
state of affairs will continue indefinitely, unless there is strong evidence to the contrary. 
Judgment conventions, like Tversky and Kahneman‟s (1974) heuristics, provide 
reasonable, but imperfect, ways of reaching decisions – decisions that are often error-
prone and sometimes even biased. The imperfect nature of both heuristics and judgment 
conventions permits them to account for various real-world behaviours that are not 
accountable for by models assuming rationality on the part of agents. 
 Keynes did not think that expectations could be measured or modelled accurately 
so did not specify the process of expectation formation in detail. However, Hicks (1939) 
suggested that expectations could be formed by simply extrapolating a trend in a data 
series into the future – Meeks (1991) took this to be an example of a Keynesian judgment 
convention, such as the one I gave as an example in the previous paragraph. The essence 
of Hicks‟ view is that people predict the future value of a variable by observing how that 
variable behaved in the past – I will refer to this as the Extrapolative Expectations model 
(EE). While this is, of course, a perfectly sensible means of proceeding – and the essence 
of many statistical forecasting models – it is not the only information that can be used for 
forecasting.  
 After Keynes, economics followed an increasingly rationalistic trajectory with 
regard to the assumed nature of homo economicus (Krugman, 2009). In this rationalistic 
view, if there is information that an economic agent can use then he or she should use it. 
One important source of information that can be used by a forecaster is his or her 
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previous forecast errors. This insight forms the basis of the Adaptive Expectations (AE) 
approach whereby an agent will revise his or her forecasts on the basis of the accuracy of 
previous forecasts (Cagan, 1956; Nerlove, 1958). So, for example, if the last forecast was 
too high then the next will be adjusted down, and so forth. Further, if previous forecast 
error is low then forecasts will be revised little, whereas large forecast errors will result in 
large revisions.  
 But still there is further information that the rational forecaster could use – in 
addition to past values of the to-be-forecast data series and previous forecast error there 
may be indicator series and contextual information that could improve forecasting. For 
instance, when forecasting sales of a product, one would think that marketing spend will 
be a leading indicator for sales (i.e. increased spending will precede increased sales), and 
that the launch of a related product by a competitor would be relevant contextual 
information. Indicators are of particular use when the target variable is difficult, 
expensive and/or slow to measure and thus values may be unavailable. 
 So, as economic agents became more rational, so did the means by which they 
formed their expectations. According to the Rational Expectations model (RE: Minford, 
1992; Munth, 1961), people take all relevant information into account when forming their 
expectations. In its purest form, the RE model also requires that information is used in an 
optimal way, meaning that predictions are also optimal – no other model can do better – 
which implies that although forecasts might not be perfect they should be unbiased 
(because then a model correcting for this bias could do better). 
 Although these models have been around for quite some time we are only aware 
of one instance where they are tested against each other in the laboratory – an experiment 
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conducted by myself with colleagues 15 years ago (Harvey, Bolger & McClelland, 1994; 
henceforth HBM). In this experiment regression analyses and lack of performance 
improvement suggested that the AE model was inappropriate – and the RE model was 
rejected because of sub-optimal within-series forecasts and biased cross-series forecasts. 
We concluded that within series forecasts were made by extrapolation, specifically by 
using the most recent value of the to-be-forecast series as an anchor and adjusting it by 
the most recent change in the series so as to accommodate any trend – this is essentially 
the extrapolative heuristic suggested by Jones (1979), but never previously tested 
empirically. Cross-series forecasting – equivalent to using an indicator series – was very 
poor and seemed to be based on a faulty conditional rule. 
 To my knowledge HBM has not to date been followed-up so we are left only with 
the tentative conclusion that EE‟s are probably the best candidate for economic 
expectations.  However, HBM used a task that was not very representative of what people 
might be called upon to do in everyday life, so the external validity of our findings is 
questionable – in the current research we wish to be able to generalize to expectation 
formation in consumers, specifically, as their expectations are crucial to predicting and 
understanding the business cycle. In HBM we presented participants with data based on a 
predator-prey relationship, thus there were two out-of-phase sine waves, one for the 
predator and one for the prey. As levels of prey increase so do levels of predators until 
the prey levels asymptote, due to the existence of too many predators, leading to the 
predator levels to fall too. Eventually predator numbers fall to an extent that the numbers 
of prey start to rise again, and so on. Now these series bear some similarity to economic 
variables such as GDP and related indicators like unemployment and interest rates, but 
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the series we used were much more regular and also free of any noise. We also gave 
participants a history of five previous data points (for both predator and prey series in the 
first half of the study, but just the predator series in the second half), and they received 
regular and accurate feedback about what actually occurred – neither of these conditions 
is likely to pertain for non-professional forecasters such as consumers. What would 
happen if participants attempted a forecasting task that was more representative of the 
sort of situation where they might need to form economic expectations in their daily 
lives?  
 To answer this question I first need to specify a more realistic sort of task. Let‟s 
return to the problem faced by a consumer that I posed earlier – „should I spend or should 
I save‟? As I discussed above, this decision is in part going to be driven by the 
consumer‟s expectations about the future state of the economy and, relatedly, his or her 
personal financial situation. Now it can be assumed that these sorts of expectations are 
being formed on a regular basis, so we have realism, but in order to conduct a controlled 
experiment we need to find an analogous situation that is amenable to investigation in the 
lab. Fortunately there is such an analogue of the consumer expectation situation – this is 
the collection of data used to construct the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS: aka 
„consumer confidence‟). Every month, in many countries, a panel of consumers is asked 
to predict whether the economy generally, and his or her financial situation specifically, 
will get better or worse, and by how much – their answers are then used to compose the 
ICS for the respondents‟ home country. Of course, this situation is not exactly the same 
as the one faced by ordinary consumers because panellists are being asked to express 
their expectations in a formal way, and (potentially) on a regular basis – this means that 
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respondents are generally going to attend more closely to information relevant to the 
questions they know that they are going to be asked, and monitor the accuracy of their 
predictions. However, I believe that it is a significant step in the right direction, and has 
the added advantage of allowing us further insight into the psychology behind the ICS 
itself. Further, if judgments are elicited regarding real data for a period during which the 
ICS is measured – which I do – we can compare the predictions of our forecasters to 
those of the panel, which could be informative.  
 So how do ICS panellists form their expectations? Assuming that they are not just 
guessing then their expectations must be based on their impressions of the current 
economic situation. I am proposing that these impressions depend on cues such as current 
unemployment rates, the state of the stock market, inflation levels, interest rates etcetera.  
Of course, this information is not going to be nicely packaged for panellists – it will come 
instead from a number of sources varying in precision and reliability: news reports, 
conversations with friends, and direct experience of prices, people being laid-off and so 
forth. Again, for the purposes of this experiment, I will not try to fully replicate all the 
noise and imprecision inherent in the real-world situation. Instead I will give participants 
several cues – in a precise and non-noisy way – and see how they form expectations on 
the basis of these cues.  
 An obvious way to model the expectation formation process that I have just 
described is with Brunswick‟s (1952) „lens model‟. In this model there is a distal 
variable, or criterion, that cannot be observed directly, such as the presence of a disease 
in a patient, but which manifests through several cues, for instance symptoms such as a 
high temperature, rash, and sweating. The cues are stochastically related to the criterion 
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and some cues are better predictors of the criterion than others. Note that the criterion, or 
cues, or both, can be either continuous or discrete variables. The cues are perceived by a 
judge and integrated into a judgment regarding the criterion (e.g. whether or not the 
patient has a disease) – this is the proximal variable. In the current context the distal 
variable is the state of the economy – past, present, and in particular, future – and the 
proximal variable is consumer confidence; the cues I have already described. 
 The lens model has been adopted as the central construct in Social Judgment 
Theory (Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer & Steinmann, 1975) where judgments, social or 
otherwise, are made on the basis of learning cue-criterion relationships. In a typical study 
to investigate such „multiple cue probability learning‟ (MCPL) there are two phases: a 
learning and a test phase. In the learning phase, participants engage in a number of trials 
where they see the values of cues and then are told the value of the criterion – sometimes 
participants are asked to predict the criterion before its value is revealed. In the test 
phase, participants receive several trials where they are again shown the values of the 
same cues that they saw in the learning phase and are asked to make predictions 
regarding the value of the criterion – generally no outcome feedback (OFB) is given in 
this phase.  
 In MCPL studies researchers seek answers to two key questions: how good are 
people at predicting the criterion on the basis of the cues given? And how, and how well, 
are the cues used in order to make judgments? The first of these is referred to as 
„achievement‟ and can be examined by the correlation between the criterion and the 
judgments of the criterion. The second is termed „cue utilization‟ and can be examined 
through comparison of the correlations between cues and judgments with correlations 
 10 
between cues and criterion (e.g. if cue utilization is good then people should place more 
weight in their judgments on those cues that better predict the criterion). Brunswick 
stressed that the correlations between cues and criterion are an extremely important 
feature of the task in that cue-criterion correlations place an upper-limit on judges‟ 
performance. Thus, for instance, if a set of cues can only explain 50% of the variance in 
the criterion then that is also the best that a judge can do. Further, if one is interested in 
looking at the learning and judgment of anyone who might loosely be described as 
„expert‟ (i.e. performing a judgment task where they have prior experience with the cue-
criterion relationships) then performance will almost certainly be impaired if the task cue-
criterion correlations, or „validities‟, do not correspond to the cue-criterion correlations 
experienced in the real-world (the „ecological validities‟). In the study to be described 
here I wish to give participants the opportunity to use their previous experience about the 
economy when making their predictions, or at very least, I do not want to make the cue-
criterion relationships such that they are contrary to what participants might expect. To 
this end I use real economic data that participants will have been exposed to in their 
recent past. 
 In the current experiment I use the same basic design as described above, but with 
one important difference. In a typical MCPL set-up each coupling of cues and criterion 
(trial) is independent and the order of presentation of trials is randomized (or at least, 
counter-balanced). However, a member of an ICS panel observes cue-criterion relations 
for a particular month (and possibly for several months in the past) and then makes a 
prediction. The next month the panellist does the same thing, and this is the next „trial‟. 
Thus in this situation the cues and criterion at each trial are most likely not independent – 
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economic time-series, which are what we have, typically display trends and cycles that 
introduce significant amounts of serial dependency or „autocorrelation‟. As I mentioned 
in the previous paragraph, I am using real economic data that indeed contains substantial 
autocorrelation. One solution to this would be to randomly select the data for each trial 
from the time-series of the cues and criterion, of course ensuring that all data at each trial 
comes from the same month for the cues, and n months into the future for the criterion. 
There are some problems with this approach, though. First, the autocorrelation itself can 
be regarded as an important and useful cue – removing it will almost certainly make the 
task more difficult for participants. Second, and relatedly, studies of expectation 
formation and judgmental forecasting, such as HBM, use time-series regression analyses 
to identify what information from the past is used by forecasters to make their predictions 
– with each month‟s data removed from its historical context such analysis could not be 
performed. Third, as discussed above, I wish to maintain the ecological validities of the 
cue-criterion relationships as far as possible, and disordering the time-series in this 
manner will be detrimental to this goal (and again negatively impact on performance). 
For these reasons I have opted not to disorder the time-series used in this study. 
 Although, I will be facilitating judgment as far as possible by providing 
ecologically valid cues, presented as they would be in reality (as consecutive 
observations in time-series), and giving data in a regular manner, with no omissions, and 
free of any degradation (three conditions unlikely to pertain for ICS panellists), I do not 
anticipate either good achievement or cue utilization on the part of my participants. The 
reasons for this are that HBM found such poor cross-series forecasting with a much 
simpler task (only one cue, noiseless series) and because the typical finding of MCPL 
 12 
studies is that, unless the situation is very simple (i.e. very few cues that are uncorrelated 
and positively related to the criterion), learning from outcome feedback is slow or non-
existent (e.g. Deane, Hammond & Summers, 1972; Klayman, 1988).  My task is 
relatively complex, requiring more computational effort on the part of participants than a 
typical MCPL task or the one used by HBM, thus the heuristic strategies of extrapolative 





27 undergraduates (11 M, 16 F) aged 19-24 participated for course credit. All the 
participants were Turkish. 
 
Materials 
The stimuli were quarterly Turkish economic series for the 6-year period 2003-Q3 to 
2009-Q2; the most recent data being for the quarter immediately preceding the study. The 
four indictor series were the current unemployment rate, annual interest and inflation 
rates, and stock-index change from the last quarter – all as percentages. There were two 
criterion series, one for each experimental group: GDP expressed as percentage change or 
absolute value (constant-price index).  
 If these participants use the within-series forecasting strategy found by HBM – 
estimating trend from the last change in the series and adding this to the most recently 
observed value of the series – then those receiving GDP-change series should find the 
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task easier than those receiving absolute-GDP series because no trend computation is 
needed. However, much autocorrelation that is useful for forecasting is absent from 
change series so the opposite result might be observed.  
 To disguise the source of the data, and facilitate presentation, the series were 
rescaled to be within similar ranges. The data covered about one cycle from trough-to-
trough of the business cycle and were presented on 23 PowerPoint slides in each phase, 
one for each trial. There was a 2-Quarter moving window so the participants always saw 
the most recent past values of cues and the current values (see Figure 1). Note that in 
Phase 2 exactly the same data series were presented to participants as in Phase 1 (and in 
the same order), but no OFB was provided. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 Whereas ICS panellists normally make predictions for the next quarter to a year 
ahead, my participants did not really forecast at all, but merely report the current value of 
the criterion given the current values of cues. The reason for this is to maintain 
comparability with MCPL studies and HBM‟s cross-series forecasting task. Lagging the 








Participants were first supplied with general written instructions and a response sheet for 
Phase 1, where predictions for each quarter could be made by putting an X in one of 10 
boxes covering the range the series fell within.  
 Participants were tested in two experimental groups. In addition to the written 
instructions the experimenter explained that the experiment required economic 
forecasting but that economic expertise was not required. Further, there would be two 
parts to the experiment and that details of the second part would be given after the first 
was completed.  After the participants wrote their name, age and sex on the response 
sheets, and any questions were answered by the experimenter, the first data slide of Phase 
1 was presented. The imminent presentation of each new slide was announced by the 
query „ready?‟ when additional time for responses could be requested. After Phase 1 the 
response sheets were collected in, the response sheets for Phase 2 distributed, and further 
instructions given. A second set of response sheets identical to those at Phase 1 were 
handed out. The slides for Phase 2 were presented in the same way as for Phase 1, then 
the second response sheets were collected and the participants debriefed. 
 
Results 
Figure 2 shows the forecasts for the four different conditions of the experiment averaged 
over the 13 participants in each of these four conditions
1
. It can be seen that Phase-1 
Change forecasts tend to lag behind the true series by approximately a Quarter, except for 
the last 2 Quarters where participants prematurely forecast a recovery. Phase-2 Change 
forecasts are very similar to Phase 1 – forecasts are of lower amplitude than true, 
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probably due to averaging over participants‟ forecasts. Phase-1 Absolute forecasts quite 
closely track the true series, but they too mostly lag behind by about a Quarter. At Phase 
2 there is much less trend and consequently the true series is tracked poorly. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Achievement: How Good Were the Forecasts? 
Two aspects of the accuracy were analyzed: mean signed error (True - Forecast), 
representing bias, and mean absolute percent error (MAPE), which is comparable across 
different measurement scales, were computed for each participant. Excepting Phase-1 
Change forecasts there was significant positive bias indicating that forecasts were too low 
– they lagged behind a mostly positively trended series. The MAPE‟s for the 2 conditions 
x 2 phases, and t-tests comparing these performances, are shown in Table 1. The best the 
participants could have done using the cues available was a MAPE of 48.1% for the 
Change series, and 1.24% for the Absolute (using the best-fitting regression models on 
the cue and criterion series provided). It is clear the Absolute series is much easier to 
forecast than the Change series, presumably due to the relatively strong trend, and thus 
autocorrelation. It can also be seen that Phase-1 Change accuracy was not significantly 
different from the benchmark, whereas Absolute forecasts at both phases were clearly 
and significantly worse. Phase-2 Change forecasts were slightly worse than benchmark 
(but still not significantly), whereas Absolute forecasts were hugely (and again 
significantly) worse.  
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
Cue Utilization 
The cues used for forecasting were compared with the cues that should have been used 
according to their ecological validities. Cue utilization is good for the Change series – 
participants paid attention to the most relevant cues: previous GDP change (where 
available); and unemployment rates and stock prices; although stock-price change was 
given too much weight, particularly at Phase 2 (see Table 2). Cue utilization was also fair 
for the Absolute series. The best predictor by far was previous GDP – reflecting the 
strong trend in the series – which was preferred when available. Otherwise indicators of 
interest rates, inflation and stock prices were the most highly correlated with the criterion, 
and these were the cues used. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
How Were Forecasts Made?  
I conducted stepwise regressions with average forecasts as the criterion and with 9 (Phase 
1) or 8 (Phase 2) predictors (since previous values of the criterion were not given at Phase 
2, this was not included as a predictor at Phase 2) using standardized data. The remaining 
8 predictors were the current and previous values of the four cues. The best-fitting 
models for the Change series were: 
Phase-1 Forecasts = 0.85 Previous GDP + 0.41 Stock Prices, R
2 
(adjusted) = 86%  
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The best-fitting models for the Absolute series were: 
Phase-1 Forecasts = 0.93 Previous GDP, R
2 
(adjusted) = 87%  
Phase-2 Forecasts = 0.63 Previous Interest Rates, R
2 
(adjusted) = 36% 
All β‟s are significant p = .016 or less. Note that the residuals displayed no significant 
autocorrelation suggesting that the R
2
 values are not overestimates.  
 Phase-1 forecasts in both conditions were apparently made using a naïve 
forecasting strategy (i.e. giving the last true value of the criterion as the forecast) with 
some adjustment based on current stock-price change in the case of the Change series. 
Naïve forecasting tends to lead to forecasts lagging behind the true series when there is 
trend, this accounts for the observed bias and consequent suboptimal performance 
described above – the adjustment in the Change series was not sufficient to overcome this 
bias. Phase-2 forecasts could not be made using a naïve strategy because previous GDP 
values were no longer available. Forecasts appear instead to have been made using 
current unemployment rates and stock-price change (Change series), or solely using prior 
interest rates (Absolute series). 
 I also conducted similar analyses to those described above for the average 
forecasts to discover the determinants of each individual participant‟s forecasts. In this 
case I added an additional predictor, the participant‟s own prior forecast, this being 
available to each participant on his or her response sheet
2
. For Phase-1 Change series the 
stepwise procedure found a significant model for all but two of the participants. In 
accordance with the analysis of average forecasts, previous values of GDP, and current 
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and previous values of stock-price change, were the predictors of forecasts appearing 
most commonly in the models (see Figure 3). The analysis of Phase-1 Absolute series 
produced significant models for all participants and a similar pattern of cue usage to that 
for the Change series, with prior values of GDP and prior and current stock-price change 
appearing most often as predictors in the models. Overall cue usage appears to have been 
greater by participants in the Absolute condition than the Change, though, and reliance on 
prior GDP was significantly greater in the former condition than the latter (13 vs. 8 of the 
participants respectively used this cue, chi-squared = 6.19, p = .013).  Comparison of cue-
usage between the Change and Absolute conditions at Phase 2 also shows some 
similarities and some differences (see Figure 3). In both conditions previous and current 
stock-price change appeared frequently in the models, and to a lesser extent current and 
prior unemployment rates. However, although for the Change condition it was stock-
price change that most commonly best predicted forecasts, for the Absolute condition it 
was the prior forecast – I will attempt to account for this second, and somewhat puzzling, 
finding in the Discussion section. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Are the Forecasts like Consumer Confidence? 
The Central Bank of Turkey started to construct a consumer confidence index (CBCCI) 
monthly starting in December 2003. The index is based on the responses to a short survey 
of around 2000 individuals over the age of 15 who are in employment – the sample is 
designed to be representative of the overall population in terms of age, employment status 
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and income groups. Each respondent has a 50% chance of being surveyed a second time 
(after 3 months) so opportunities for learning are very limited, particularly in comparison 
to my experimental setup. Four tendencies are measured in the survey: personal financial 
standing (4 questions); general economic situation (5 questions); expenditure plans (4 
questions); and price expectations (1 question). I compare the forecasts in my study to 
responses to two questions designed to measure attitudes regarding the general economic 
situation to the forecasts of my participants: “compared to the past 3 months the current 
economic situation is much worse (a little worse, about the same, a little better, much 
better)”; “in the next 3 months the economic situation will get much worse, get a little 
worse (stay about the same, get a little better, get much worse)”. The first of these 
questions seems the most directly comparable to the task in my experiment because, as I 
already pointed out, participants are more accurately „nowcasting‟ than forecasting. In 
other words, the task was to estimate the current value of GDP given its previous value 
and previous and current values of the indicator cues. However, we can also compare the 
nowcasts to consumer confidence regarding the next quarter by lagging the latter by one 
quarter. Thus, for example, estimates of the GDP for Q1 of 2008 made by my participants 
should be equivalent to consumer confidence for the next quarter measured in Q4 of 
2007. 
 The task of respondents to the CBCCI survey is to forecast change in the 
economic situation – this is equivalent to what my participants in the Change condition 
had to do. In order to make the task equivalent in the Absolute condition, I computed the 
difference between each consecutive average forecast. These „first differences‟, as they 
are known, represent the amount of change in GDP each quarter forecast by participants 
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in the Absolute condition and result in series that appear quite similar to the 
corresponding Change average forecasts for the two phases. The correlations of forecasts 
in each condition and at each phase of the experiment with the two measures of consumer 
confidence are shown in Table 3. It can be seen that correspondence between Change 
forecasts at both phases are moderately and significantly correlated with both consumer 
confidence measures whereas the correlations between Absolute forecasts and each of the 
two consumer confidence measures at both phases are weak and non-significant despite 
being rendered equivalent. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Discussion 
The findings suggest a much more optimistic picture regarding the quality of consumer 
expectations than did those of HBM. Although in Phase 1 (both conditions) the MAPE‟s 
were huge compared to those obtained in this earlier study the task was much harder. 
Further, at Phase 2 the MAPE‟s for both conditions were substantially lower then the 
cross-series MAPE of 73% observed by HBM. Also, in the Change condition at both 
Phase 1 and 2 the MAPE was not significantly larger than that for the benchmark 
regression model. True, the MAPE‟s for the Absolute condition are very poor compared 
to what could be achieved even by a naïve forecaster, and Change forecast MAPE‟s at 
Phase 1 are hardly any better than the naïve benchmark, but then Change forecasts hold 
up pretty well when outcome feedback is removed (when naïve forecasting is no longer 
possible). Cue utilization was also pretty good – participants in both conditions tended 
towards the best cues. Taken together the evidence is that, in this more realistic task than 
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that used by HBM, and under certain conditions (i.e. no strong within-series trend), 
people may be able to make a reasonable attempt at cross-series forecasting after all.  
 My interpretation of the results is that, when confronted with a set of cues for a 
novel prediction task the participants quickly discovered if there was a cue that was 
highly predictive of the criterion – as was the case with previous GDP in the Absolute 
condition – and used this cue while ignoring other cues. If the participants could not find 
a clearly dominant cue – as was the case for the Change series – then they sought 
something that would work and, mostly, seemed to find it. By the end of Phase 1 more 
than 50% of participants in the Change condition were using either stocks or 
unemployment (or both) and these were indeed the best cues to use. When it came to 
Phase 2 the fact that those in the Absolute condition had an easy time at Phase 1 may 
have meant that not all the available cues were properly appraised. Thus when the 
dominant cue was removed – the one that had been relied on – these participants were in 
trouble. Hence the big increase in error at Phase 2 for these forecasters. In contrast, those 
in the Change condition had to attend to the cues at Phase 1 that, fortuitously, were still 
available at Phase 2, and as a consequence they suffered little when outcome feedback 
was removed.  
 Thus in both conditions participants quickly found the best cues to use for 
forecasting at Phase 1 and used them – this seems clear from the data – but how did they 
find these cues? In a standard MCPL experiment, good cue utilization can only be the 
result of learning, however, in my study there is another possibility. As a consequence of 
using real (and recent) economic data that was correctly labelled, participants could have 
been using their domain knowledge to guide cue selection rather than inducing which 
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cues to use purely from the data given. Thus participants may have simply inferred that 
stock prices and unemployment rates are the best predictors of GDP. The participant-by-
participant analysis shown in Figure 3 provides some support for this view because we 
can see that stocks and unemployment were the most highly used cues at Phase 1 after 
previous GDP in both conditions despite the fact that interest rates and inflation had 
higher ecological validities as cues in the Absolute condition (see Table 2). If people are 
selecting cues on the basis of their past experience, and the cues they choose happen to 
coincide with those with the highest ecological validity, as in the Change condition, then 
this might explain why cue utilization is so good despite relatively little time to learn (in 
MCPL time – of course 23 quarters is nearly 6 years in real time, and much much longer 
than the time available to consumer-confidence panellists to learn on the job).  
 It is important to note, though, that it may not be entirely accidental that 
participants chose the cues with the highest ecological validities on the basis of their 
experience, this is what Brunswick would have expected. Incidental learning of 
ecological validities is also claimed by neo-Brunswikians, most notably Gerd Gigerenzer 
(e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Kleinbölting, 1991), if not yet reliably demonstrated. Cue 
selection at Phase 1 cannot be solely top-down, though – the greater reliance on the 
previous value of GDP in the Absolute condition than in the Change condition suggests 
that the participants were also attending to the feedback regarding cue validities in the 
task at hand, or were at least sensitive to features of the stimulus series when formulating 
their forecasting strategy (cf. Bolger & Harvey, 1993). Further, even if participants were 
using prior experience to determine which cues to attend to in the Change condition this 
does not preclude them also monitoring the success of these cues by attending to 
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feedback (in the Absolute condition use of stocks and unemployment would not be 
negatively reinforced for those who also used previous GDP because their overall 
strategy would work reasonably well). I therefore conclude that a mixture of top-down 
and bottom-up processes were used for forecasting at Phase 1. At Phase 2 participants in 
both conditions continued to favour stocks and unemployment for forecasting, which was 
fine in the case of the Change series but not so good in the case of the Absolute, thus 
contributing to the relative collapse in performance in the latter condition at Phase 2. 
 So were expectations rational, adaptive or extrapolative? In the Absolute 
condition the forecasts were clearly not rational because the MAPE‟s were too high, even 
at Phase 1, and there was a clear bias due to under-adjusting for trend. However, there is 
evidence that Absolute forecasts may have been adaptive for some participants, previous 
forecast error being a significant predictor of 4 out of the 13 participants‟ Phase 1 
forecasts. For the majority, though, Phase 1 Absolute forecasts, being a proportion of the 
previous value of the criterion series, were clearly extrapolative. Phase 2 Absolute 
forecasts could not be adaptive, as without OFB there was no way for participants to 
judge their forecast error. They could not be extrapolative either, at least in the sense that 
they merely extended the past values of the to-be-forecast series into the future since this 
series was no longer available to them. However, I wish to propose loosening the 
definition of EE‟s that I gave in the Introduction to include forecasts based on 
observation of any relevant historic information, not just that relating to the variable to be 
forecast, and indeed, information about the present situation too – I do not think this 
looser definition goes against the spirit of either Katona‟s or Keynes‟ understanding of 
extrapolative expectations. By this definition, the Absolute forecasts at Phase 2 could be 
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regarded as extrapolative if they relied on some information from the past or current 
situation excepting their own forecast error (in which case they would be AE‟s), or 
everything relevant (in which case they would be RE‟s). Thus, in my view, the aggregate 
Absolute Phase 2 forecasts, that mainly seemed to depend on previous interest rates, 
should be considered extrapolative.  
 Analysis of the individual forecasting strategies shows that more than half (9/13) 
of the participants in the Absolute condition made their Phase 2 forecasts using their 
previous forecast, either alone or in conjunction with some other cue. How can we 
explain this? One possibility is that, since at  Phase 2 they were forecasting exactly the 
same series as at Phase 1, they used their memory of the starting point and/or trend to 
make their forecasts and either ignored the cues altogether, or used them to make some 
adjustment to their remembered „forecast‟.  Note that due to the strong trend in the 
Absolute series any forecasts that try to replicate this trend will tend to be highly 
autocorrelated thereby increasing their probability of appearing as a significant predictor 
in the regression model. I will return to discuss the effect of memory of Phase 1 on Phase 
2 forecasting shortly. 
 Turning now to the Change forecasts, they were again suboptimal and biased so 
the RE hypothesis can be rejected (although not quite as wholeheartedly as in most 
previous studies, or indeed for the Absolute condition of this study). AE‟s have some 
support in that at the individual level 5 out of 13 participants made use of their previous 
forecast error directly. The majority, though, made their forecasts at Phase 1 using current 
and past information about the criterion and indicator series and at Phase 2 using current 
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and past information about the indicator series. Thus it appears that the Change forecasts 
are mostly extrapolative in my new, looser, sense of the term. 
  There are, of course, several limitations to the current study, but none I think is 
major. The sample size is rather small, but there is quite a lot of agreement between the 
strategies used by participants – and the effects of these strategies such as extent of error 
– within each of the two conditions leading to clear (and statistically reliable) differences. 
It does not appear to me that a larger sample size would have produced further, or 
different, information. 
 The use of economic data from just one country for a particular period of time 
could also be criticised for limiting the generalizability of the findings.  For example, it 
could have been that participants recognized the pattern of rise-and-fall in the economic 
data as part of recent history – but none admitted that they did in debriefing – future 
studies might benefit from using data from further in the past or, better, simulated data 
that maintains the ecological validity of cue-criterion correlations from the recent past, 
but permits sampling from any part of the business cycle. A related criticism is that, since 
my findings are somewhat different from HBM where we used different stimulus series, 
it seems that we need to use a wide range of series in order to fully understand how 
expectations are formed. Clearly the forecasting strategies or heuristics used are rather 
„context specific‟, as we previously observed (Bolger and Harvey, 1993). However, it 
would not be practical to explore fully the implications of changing all possible 
parameters of the stimuli in one study – a series of experiments is needed, preferably 
using simulated data to allow systematic manipulation of series‟ characteristics.  
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 Perhaps, the most serious criticism, and one that I alluded to above, is that, since 
exactly the same series, in the same order, were used twice, people may have used their 
memories of their forecasts at Phase 1 to inform their Forecasts at Phase 2. Now this is 
plausible, and would represent a feature not available to the usual ICS panellist, but I 
argue that it is not a serious flaw. Participants were not told that they would have to 
forecast the same series twice, or that the second time they would have no outcome 
feedback, so presumably they would not have tried to memorize anything at Phase 1. I 
therefore suspect that, if anything, they only had the vague impression of the fact that the 
criterion series rose and then fell to work with at Phase 2. However, in the Absolute 
condition, where the trend was fairly salient, and where participants were presumably 
clutching at straws, remembered trend may have been used by some participants, as I 
discussed above. In the Change condition where the trend was much less salient, and 
where many of the participants had identified useful cues for forecasting, it seems 
unlikely that the remembered trend would be a significant influence on the forecasts. 
However, if future studies used simulated data that maintained ecologically valid cue-
criterion correlations, as suggested above, then training and test series could be created 
that were different in appearance but were identical in every other aspect, thereby 
eliminating the possibility of basing forecast on memory. 
 A further problem with using real data is that one has no control over the size of 
the cue-criterion correlations (except by selecting indicator variables that are related in 
the way that you want to the criterion, if they exist), and also no control over the inter-cue 
correlations. Both of these factors could affect the cue utilization and achievement of 
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participants and in future studies it would be interesting to systematically manipulate 
them, again by using simulated data series.   
 Finally, it would be interesting to investigate the interaction between top-down 
and bottom-up processes. This could be done by, for example, providing stimulus series 
where the best cues were not those that the participants expected to be the best on the 
basis of past experience. This could be done by, for example, changing the labels on the 
cues – longer series than those used in this study should probably be used, though; this 




In contrast to HBM‟s findings, it seems that people can use indicator series for 
forecasting, under the right circumstances – these circumstances might include having 
naturalistic series with ecologically valid cue-criterion correlations, and not having a 
dominant cue that „blind‟ forecasters to other important information. The evidence from 
this experiment again does not favour the RE approach – too much bias, although the 
Phase-1 Change series aggregate forecast were pretty close to being as good as the least-
squares regression model. The AE model is not very-well supported by the data either, 
although a minority of the participants may have used it at Phase 1. In real life, the 
situation would be more like Phase 2, with no (explicit) outcome feedback, so an AE 
strategy could not be used (or would be difficult to use – ICS panellists are asked to make 
forecasts as much as a year into the future so that feedback, if they received it at all, 
would usually be too lagged to be of much use). Having rejected RE and AE, we 
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conclude, in agreement with HBM, that expectations were extrapolative, but not in the 
purest sense of a simple extrapolation of the criterion series, rather in a more general 
sense of being based on observations of some (but not all) past and current values of the 
criterion and relevant cues. 
 To summarize my view of the expectation-formation processes used by the 
majority in this study, first, participants try to extrapolate using within series data but if 
this does not lead to satisfactory forecasting, as for Phase 1 Change series, then indicator 
series will be used (and possibly their relationships with the criterion series learned). If 
this analysis is correct then it supports my developing view that although people might 
not use the optimal strategy when making forecasts, they find one that offers a good 
accuracy-effort trade off (Bolger & Harvey, 1993; HBM). It also raises the interesting 
question of how people determine a satisfactory level of forecasting performance against 
which to trade the effort of searching for additional cues and learning their validities. 
Plausibly each individual has his or her own thresholds for acceptable performance and 
these thresholds could be different for different task domains according to past 
experience and/or knowledge of those domains – a future line of research would therefore 
be to ascertain if such performance thresholds exist in a forecasting context and, if so, 
how they are set. 
 To conclude, although there are some limitations to the current experiment, most 
of these limitations are the consequence of using real economic series as stimuli. This 
approach more than compensated for its limitations by showing that, although too biased 
and error-full to be considered strictly „rational‟, the expectations of consumers are more 
measured than recent commentators, including myself, have suggested. Indeed my 
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findings are generally pretty favourable regarding the idea of using consumer-based 
forecasts as indicators of the future state of the economy. For example, the average 
forecasts by the Change group predicted the current recession three Quarters before it 




Although it is, of course, of interest to examine the forecasting strategies of each 
participant individually it is the average forecasts that are of central interest here. This is 
because these are the equivalent of measures of consumer expectations such as the ICS 
(although based on a much smaller sample, of course). Further, it is the economic 
expectations of groups rather than individuals that are typically the subject of economic 
theory and practice. Participant-by-participant analyses are of interest to Psychologists, 
though, and I will refer to these in order to interpret the average forecasts better. 
 
2
It seems reasonable to focus on the cues directly available to participants, however, I 
also conducted regression analyses using predictors that could be derived from the data, 
namely the difference between current and prior indicators and, for individual data, the 
forecast error (it is not meaningful for aggregate data). The former did not enter 
significantly into either the analysis of aggregate data or that for individual participants 
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 Mean SD Comparison t p Cohen’s 
d 
CH1 0.13 0.54 µ = 0 0.85 .410 0.24 
CH2 0.28 0.30 µ = 0 2.87 .014 0.93 
AB1 0.38 0.37 µ = 0 3.67 .003 1.03 
AB2 1.13 0.82 µ = 0 4.97 <.001 1.38 
 
b 
 Mean SD Comparison t p Cohen’s 
d 
CH1 49.3% 12.8% CH1 v. CH2 2.01 .067 0.56 
CH2 56.0% 16.9% CH1 v. AB1 3.76 .001 1.53 
AB1 31.7% 11.1% AB1 v. AB2 2.98 .011 0.83 
AB2 64.2% 40.2% CH2 v. AB2 0.68 .505 0.28 
 
Table 1: (a). Mean-Signed Error (MSE) and (b) Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE) 
for the two conditions at each of the two experimental phases (CH1 = Change series, 
Phase 1; AB2 = Absolute series, Phase 2 etc.). 
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                       CUES 
Change Series Absolute Series 
EV       CU-1    CU-2 EV       CU-1     CU-2 
 Interest Rates +.08 +.00 +.14 -.51* -.44* -.63* 
 Unemployment -.55* -.34 -.22 -.25 -.01 +.12 
Prior Inflation -.18 -.19 +.01 -.56* -.33 -.55* 
 Stock Prices +.59* +.32 +.32 -.24 -.42* -.45* 
 GDP +.53* +.83*  ---- +.95* +.95*  ---- 
 Interest Rates +.19 +.14 +.17 -.40 -.31 -.52* 
Current  Unemployment -.65* -.58* -.43* -.15 +.09 -.17 
 Inflation -.15 -.20 -.07 -.31 -.17 -.46* 
 Stock Prices +.17 +.37 +.80* -.41 -.36 -.44* 
 
Table 2. Cue ecological validities (EV) and cue utilization for each of the two phases 
(CU-1 and CU-2, respectively) broken-down by series type (Change or Absolute). The 






Current  Situation Lag 1 Next Quarter 
Change Phase 1           .48*           .55** 
Change Phase 2           .62**           .50* 
Absolute Phase 1           .08            14 
Absolute Phase 2           .27           .26 
 
Table 3. Correspondence between forecasts in the current experiment and consumer 
confidence measured during the same historic period from which the experimental 
stimuli were drawn, broken-down by experimental condition and confidence measure. 
The figures are Pearson correlation coefficients and a single asterisk indicates p < .05, 
two asterisks p < .01. 
 35 
Phase 1 
  INT   UNE    INF   STO   GDP 
6.13 5.10 7.57 +6.3 33.0 
5.20 5.10 5.99 +27.7 ? 
 
  INT   UNE    INF   STO   GDP 
5.20 5.10 5.99 +27.7 32.4 
4.60 5.45 4.44 +15.3 ? 
 
Phase 2 
  INT   UNE    INF   STO   GDP 
6.13 5.10 7.57 +6.3 XXXX 
5.20 5.10 5.99 +27.7 ? 
 
  INT   UNE    INF   STO   GDP 
5.20 5.10 5.99 +27.7 XXXX 
4.60 5.45 4.44 +15.3 ? 
 
Figure 1: Stimuli for two consecutive trials in the Absolute GDP condition at Phase 1 
and Phase 2. 
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      Phase 1, Change Series   Phase 2, Change Series 
 
 
                Phase 1, Absolute Series                           Phase 2, Absolute Series 
 
 
Figure 2: Average forecasts by condition and phase compared to the true values. 
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        Phase 1 
 
            Phase 2 
 
Figure 3:  Frequency of cues appearing as significant predictors of individual 
participant‟s forecasts as a function of experimental condition (CH is Change and AB is 
Absolute) and phase. Cues entered were: previous and current interest rates (INT), 
unemployment (UNE), inflation (INF), stock prices (STO); and previous GDP and 
forecast (FOC). 
